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        (ARGUED) 
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       United States Justice Department 
       P.O. Box 878, Ben Franklin Station 
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       Counsel for Respondent 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This is one of the tidal wave of cases seeking relief from 
orders of deportation brought by permanent resident aliens 
who have committed certain enumerated crimes. While 
many of these individuals are long-time residents with deep 
roots in American communities, they face virtually 
automatic deportation under recent amendments to the 
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), although in many 
cases the INS has only recently taken note of their long- 
past criminal activities.1 While the Attorney General 
previously could exercise discretion to grant relief from 
such deportation orders, that discretion--as well as the 
right to judicial review of denials of such discretionary relief 
--has largely been eliminated by the recent amendments to 
the INA in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996 ("AEDPA") and the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"). 
 
The Petitioner is Gerard James Catney, a permanent 
resident alien ("PRA") who was born in Northern Ireland, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See, e.g., Monica Rhor, For Joe Velasquez, There May Be No Second 
Chance, Phila. Inquirer, Mar. 31, 1999, at B1; Mirta Ojito, Old Crime 
Returns to Haunt an Immigrant, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1997, at B1; Pamela 
Constable, Years Later, Immigrants Pursued by Their Pasts, Wash. Post, 
Feb. 24, 1997, at B1. 
 
                                2 
  
arrived in this country in 1962, at the age of three, and has 
lived here for thirty-seven years. He has been married for 
almost twenty years to a United States citizen and he has 
a five-year old daughter who is also a United States citizen. 
Catney credibly argues that the Board of Immigration 
Appeals ("BIA") incorrectly applied one provision of AEDPA 
to his case, and that one provision of AEDPA and another 
provision of IIRIRA violate the equal protection component 
of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The 
government disputes each of these contentions, and further 
submits that Catney has waived his right to raise his 
constitutional claims before us because he did notfile a 
brief with the BIA and did not raise one of the 
constitutional issues in his notice of appeal to the BIA from 
the Immigration Judge's decision. 
 
We decline to reach any of these issues, however, 
because we read our recent decision in Sandoval v. Reno, 
166 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 1999), as precluding our exercising 
jurisdiction over Catney's petition.2 Rather, we conclude 
that Catney must raise his claims of legal error--whether 
constitutional or otherwise--in a petition for habeas corpus 
if he is to obtain relief from the BIA's order. 
 
I. AEDPA and IIRIRA 
 
A. Judicial Review of Deportation Orders 
 
In 1996, Congress enacted both AEDPA and IIRIRA, 
which dramatically restricted the scope of federal court 
review of certain deportation orders. See AEDPA, Pub. L. 
No. 104-132, S 440(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1276-77 (1996); 
IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, SS 306(a)(2)(C), 
309(c)(4)(G), 110 Stat. 3009-546, -607 to -608, -626 to -627 
(1996). Prior to the enactment of these statutes, courts of 
appeals could review most orders of deportation. See 8 
U.S.C. S 1105a (repealed by IIRIRA). However, section 
440(a) of AEDPA provides that "[a]ny final order of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The government filed a petition for rehearing en banc in Sandoval on 
April 26, 1999. On May 7, 1999, an order was issued by this Court 
denying that petition. 
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deportation against an alien who is deportable by reason of 
having committed a criminal offense covered in [various 
sections of the INA]3 shall not be subject to review by any 
court." Id. S 1105a(a)(10) (repealed by IIRIRA). 
 
Section 309(c)(4)(G) of IIRIRA provides for transitional 
judicial-review rules that apply to cases commenced before 
April 1, 1997, in which a final order of deportation was filed 
after October 30, 1996, while IIRIRA section 306(a)(2)(C) 
(codified at 8 U.S.C. S 1252(a)(2)(C) (Supp. II 1996)) sets 
forth the appropriate judicial-review mechanism for cases 
commenced on or after April 1, 1997. The latter two 
provisions are, for our purposes, similar to AEDPA section 
440(a). The INS commenced deportation proceedings 
against Catney in 1992. The BIA entered a final order of 
deportation against him on February 11, 1998. This case is 
therefore governed by the transitional rules of IIRIRA. 
 
B. Relief from Deportation 
 
Although "criminal aliens" such as Catney have long been 
subject to deportation, at least two provisions of the INA 
formerly provided these aliens with the opportunity to seek 
discretionary relief from deportation: section 212(c), and 
section 212(h), which we discuss infra. 
 
1. Section 212(c) 
 
Section 212(c) gave the Attorney General discretion to 
waive deportation of certain PRAs. See 8 U.S.C. S 1182(c) 
(repealed 1996). Prior to 1990, section 212(c) provided that, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The covered crimes include aggravated felonies, controlled substance 
convictions, certain firearm offenses, miscellaneous national security or 
defense crimes, and multiple convictions for crimes involving moral 
turpitude. In 1991, Catney pled guilty in New Jersey state court to 
armed robbery and armed burglary, and was sentenced to seven years 
imprisonment. Although Catney's brief describes the offense as a mere 
car theft, related to excessive drinking in response to stress, it was 
obviously of sufficient seriousness to trigger the statute. There is thus 
no 
dispute that Catney is a "criminal alien" subject to deportation under the 
INA, and that he is covered by the judicial-review and relief-from- 
deportation provisions we discuss in the text. 
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notwithstanding section 212(a)'s provisions for exclusion of 
certain aliens, "[a]liens lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily 
and not under an order of deportation, and who are 
returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven 
consecutive years, may be admitted in the discretion of the 
Attorney General," with certain limited exceptions. 
 
In a series of decisions, the BIA (which acts on behalf of 
the Attorney General) had interpreted section 212(c) to 
apply not only to PRAs who had temporarily left the country 
and were "returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile," 
as the statute literally provides, but also to those PRAs who 
had left and returned, and then--at some later date--faced 
deportation. Therefore, PRAs who lived here for seven or 
more years and never left the country were not covered by 
section 212(c)'s waiver provision, but PRAs who lived here 
for seven or more years, and during that time happened to 
take a trip abroad (even a day-trip to Canada), would be 
eligible for the section 212(c) waiver if they ever faced 
deportation. In 1976, the Second Circuit extended the 
section 212(c) waiver to the final group of PRAs, i.e., those 
who had never left the country. See Francis v. INS, 532 
F.2d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 1976). The INS acquiesced in the 
holding in Francis, and most courts of appeals followed it 
as well. See, e.g., Katsis v. INS, 997 F.2d 1067, 1070 (3d 
Cir. 1993). Therefore, by the 1990s, section 212(c) offered 
all PRAs who had lawfully resided in this country for seven 
consecutive years the possibility of relief from deportation. 
 
In 1990, section 212(c) was amended to eliminate a new 
category of cases from the Attorney General's discretion: 
PRAs deportable by reason of having committed certain 
aggravated felonies for which the alien had been imprisoned 
for at least five years. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 
No. 101-649, S 511(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5052. In 1996, 
AEDPA section 440(d) extended the list of ineligible PRAs 
much further, eliminating the Attorney General's discretion 
to grant relief from deportation for the same group of 
deportees for whom judicial review was curtailed in section 
440(a) (i.e., those convicted of aggravated felonies, 
controlled substance offenses, certain firearm offenses, 
miscellaneous national security or defense crimes, or 
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multiple convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude).4 
Therefore, under section 440(d) of AEDPA, criminal aliens 
such as Catney are ineligible for section 212(c) 
discretionary relief from the Attorney General. While the 
BIA has held that this provision applies retrospectively to 
cases pending on the date that AEDPA was enacted, we 
disagreed in Sandoval, holding that the provision does not 
apply to pending deportation cases such as Catney's. See 
Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 242. 
 
2. Section 212(h) 
 
Section 212(h) of the INA, like former section 212(c), 
provides the Attorney General with discretion to waive 
certain deportation orders. Section 212(h) permits the 
Attorney General to do so for those persons subject to 
deportation due to their commission of certain crimes if the 
alien is: 
 
       the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the 
       United States or an alien lawfully admitted for 
       permanent residence if it is established to the 
       satisfaction of the Attorney General that the alien's 
       denial of admission would result in extreme hardship 
       to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, 
       parent, son, or daughter of such alien; and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The specific language of the proviso in section 212(c), added by 
section 
440(d) of AEDPA, reads as follows: "This subsection shall not apply to an 
alien who is deportable by reason of having committed any criminal 
offense [listed above]." The BIA has held that, because the proviso only 
speaks of "an alien who is deportable," it does not apply to a PRA who 
has left the country and is excludable (rather than deportable) by reason 
of conviction of one of the relevant offenses. See In re Fuentes-Campos, 
Int. Dec. 3318, 17 Immigr. Case Rep. (MB) B1-267, -269 (BIA May 14, 
1997) (en banc) (rejecting the government's argument that the proviso 
should apply to PRAs facing exclusion). 
 
The difference between exclusion and deportation is that an alien who 
is physically present in this country is subject to deportation, while an 
alien who is attempting to enter or return to the country is subject to 
exclusion. IIRIRA has, for all relevant purposes, eliminated any disparate 
treatment of aliens on the basis of whether they face deportation or 
exclusion, replacing these two proceedings with the single "removal" 
proceeding. 
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       the Attorney General, in his discretion, . . . has 
       consented to the alien's applying or reapplying for a 
       visa, for admission to the United States, or adjustment 
       of status. 
 
8 U.S.C. S 1182(h)(1)(B), (h)(2) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). This 
provision clearly applies to Catney, whose wife and 
daughter are United States citizens. He is also the primary 
breadwinner for his family, running his own house painting 
business, which has been successful enough for the 
Catneys to purchase their own home in New Jersey. While 
his underlying request for section 212(h) relief is not before 
us, he appears to have a colorable claim to such relief. 
 
Section 348(a) of IIRIRA, however, added the following 
proviso to section 212(h): 
 
       No waiver shall be granted under this subsection in the 
       case of an alien who has previously been admitted to 
       the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for 
       permanent residence if either since the date of such 
       admission the alien has been convicted of an 
       aggravated felony or the alien has not lawfully resided 
       continuously in the United States for a period of not 
       less than 7 years immediately preceding the date of 
       initiation of proceedings to remove the alien from the 
       United States. 
 
8 U.S.C. S 1182(h) (Supp. II 1996).5  As a PRA who has 
committed an aggravated felony since his lawful admission 
to this country, Catney is covered by the proviso and is 
ineligible for relief by the terms of section 212(h). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Unlike section 440(d) of AEDPA, the proviso added by IIRIRA clearly 
applies to pending cases such as the present one. IIRIRA provides that 
the amendment made by section 348(a) "shall be effective on the date of 
enactment of this Act [September 30, 1996] and shall apply in the case 
of any alien who is in exclusion or deportation proceedings as of such 
date unless a final administrative order in such proceedings has been 
entered as of such date." IIRIRA S 348(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-639. As 
noted, Catney was in deportation proceedings on September 30, 1996, 
and his deportation order was not final until February 11, 1998. 
Therefore, section 348(a) applies to him. 
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C. Administrative Proceedings 
 
Catney initially sought relief from deportation under both 
section 212(c) and section 212(h). The Immigration Judge 
denied this relief on December 18, 1996. Catney filed a 
notice of appeal to the BIA, raising issues only under 
section 212(h). After initially seeking an extension of time in 
which to file a brief, his counsel failed to file one, and the 
BIA issued a summary dismissal of his appeal on February 
11, 1998, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. S 3.1(d)(1-a)(i)(E) (1997). On 
March 9, 1998, represented by new counsel, Catney 
petitioned this Court for review of the BIA decision.6 
 
II. Discussion 
 
A. Catney's Claims 
 
Catney raises three primary issues in his petition for 
review: (1) that section 440(d) of AEDPA should not be 
applied in cases such as his that were pending on AEDPA's 
enactment date; (2) that section 440(d) violates the equal 
protection component of the Fifth Amendment by 
irrationally distinguishing between PRAs facing deportation 
and PRAs facing exclusion; and (3) that section 348(a) of 
IIRIRA violates equal protection by irrationally denying relief 
from deportation to PRAs who have committed an 
aggravated felony since their lawful admission to the 
country, while affording the opportunity for such relief to 
aliens who have committed an aggravated felony since their 
unlawful admission.7 
 
Catney's first claim arises from the Attorney General's 
determination that AEDPA section 440(d), which forecloses 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. On May 11, 1998, Catney also filed, through his new counsel, a 
motion to the BIA seeking to reopen his case and to stay his deportation. 
This motion remains pending before the BIA. 
 
7. See In re Michel, Int. Dec. 3335, 18 Immigr. Case Rep. (MB) B1-108, 
-111 (BIA Jan. 30, 1998) (en banc) ("We find that the language of the 
amendment to section 212(h) of the Act provides plainly that the 
aggravated felony bar to eligibility for relief applies only to an alien 
who 
has previously been admitted to the United States for lawful permanent 
residence."). 
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criminal aliens such as Catney from obtaining section 
212(c) relief, should be applied to cases pending on 
AEDPA's enactment date. We have recently held differently 
in Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 242, although, as we discuss 
below, Catney may obtain the benefit of our ruling, if at all, 
only through the filing of a habeas petition. Catney's second 
claim is based on the elimination of discretionary relief 
from deportation for criminal aliens under amended section 
212(c), without a concomitant elimination of discretionary 
relief from exclusion for criminal aliens. See supra note 4. 
Catney argues that this distinction fails rational basis 
review and violates the equal protection component of the 
Fifth Amendment because there is no rational justification 
for Congress to afford criminal aliens outside of the country 
more generous treatment than it does those like him who 
remain in the country. 
 
For his third claim, Catney likewise argues that the 
distinction drawn by Congress violates equal protection. 
Under the IIRIRA amendment to section 212(h), aggravated 
felons who are lawful residents are ineligible for the family 
hardship waiver from deportation, while aggravated felons 
who arrived in this country illegally remain eligible for the 
waiver. Catney argues with some force that there is nothing 
rational about a law that favors those who have committed 
at least two crimes--illegal entry to this country and then 
an aggravated felony--over those who have committed only 
one--an aggravated felony, following lawful admission to 
the country. 
 
As noted, the government contends that Catney has 
waived these issues by not briefing them before the BIA and 
by failing to raise the section 440(d) issues in his notice of 
appeal to the BIA. It also contests Catney's substantive 
arguments regarding the retrospective application of section 
440(d) and the constitutionality of the two provisions 
discussed above. 
 
B. Jurisdiction 
 
We retain jurisdiction to adjudicate statutory or 
constitutional claims such as those raised by Catney, as 
well as to review denials of relief from deportation, in the 
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case of most aliens other than criminal aliens. See 8 U.S.C. 
S 1252(a)(1) (Supp. II 1996) (providing for judicial review of 
final order of removal in the courts of appeals); id. 
S 1252(b)(4) (outlining the scope and standard of judicial 
review of a final order of removal); id. S 1252(b)(9) (providing 
that judicial review of all factual and legal questions, 
"including interpretation and application of constitutional 
and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or 
proceeding brought to remove an alien . . . shall be 
available only in judicial review of a final order under this 
section"). However, following passage of AEDPA and IIRIRA, 
we no longer have jurisdiction to review a denial of 
discretionary relief to a criminal alien such as Catney. See 
id. S 1252(a)(2)(C); Morel v. INS, 144 F.3d 248, 252 (3d Cir. 
1998). Further, we conclude that any challenge by a 
criminal alien to the BIA's interpretation of the immigration 
laws or to the constitutionality of these laws must be made 
through a habeas petition.8 Therefore, we decline to reach 
the substantive issues raised by Catney or the 
government's waiver arguments. 
 
Although it may have been unclear following passage of 
AEDPA and IIRIRA whether a criminal alien such as Catney 
could raise statutory or constitutional issues in a petition 
for review of a deportation order, Sandoval has resolved this 
issue for cases arising in our circuit. Sandoval was a 
consolidated appeal that included both a petition for review 
of a BIA order and an appeal from a district court order 
granting the petitioner habeas relief. We concluded that 
habeas jurisdiction survived AEDPA's and IIRIRA's 
limitations on judicial review of certain deportation orders, 
but that direct review did not. See Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. A circuit split on this issue currently exists. Compare LaGuerre v. 
Reno, 164 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 1998) (habeas relief is no longer available 
to criminal aliens facing deportation, but constitutional claims may be 
raised on direct review in court of appeals), and Richardson v. Reno, 162 
F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 1998) (habeas relief is no longer available), 
petition 
for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3561 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1999) (No. 98-1361), with 
Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 1998) (habeas relief remains 
available), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1140 (1999), Henderson v. INS, 157 
F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998) (same), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1141 (1999), and 
Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 238 (same). 
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231-38. We noted "that this reading [of the statutes] 
comports with our obligation to read statutes to avoid 
serious constitutional problems, such as those we would 
face were IIRIRA read to take away habeas jurisdiction as 
well as [direct] review." Id. at 237. We concluded our 
discussion of the jurisdiction issue as follows: 
 
        Recognizing that its interpretation [i.e., that AEDPA 
       and IIRIRA preclude habeas review] might lead to just 
       such a constitutional dilemma, the government 
       contends that under the 1996 amendments there is 
       jurisdiction in the courts of appeals to entertain claims 
       of "substantial constitutional error" by aliens in 
       Sandoval's position. This argument must fail because of 
       the absence of any support, either in the statute or in 
       the legislative history. The government's briefs cite no 
       provision of AEDPA or IIRIRA that supports its reading 
       and it conceded at oral argument that there is no 
       specific provision granting us jurisdiction over 
       substantial constitutional claims. Although the 
       government's argument would have more force if there 
       were a constitutional imperative to read the 1996 
       statutes in that manner, our conclusion that the 
       statutes have left habeas jurisdiction intact in the 
       district courts removes any such imperative. 
 
Id. at 237-38 (emphases added). 
 
Even following Sandoval, our jurisdiction to hear claims 
of "substantial constitutional error" on petitions for review 
of BIA orders was somewhat unclear. See, e.g. , id. at 238 
n.6 ("Because of our conclusion that [habeas jurisdiction] 
covers statutory, as well as constitutional claims, we need 
not decide whether the claimed existence of jurisdiction in 
the courts of appeals to review substantial constitutional 
claims, but not statutory claims, would be an adequate 
alternative."). Indeed, at different times, each of the parties 
(Catney and the INS) took the position that jurisdiction was 
present, and then that it was lacking, even over Catney's 
claims of constitutional error. See, e.g., Pet'r Br. at 13-16; 
Pet'r Mot. to Defer Arg. at 1-2; INS Suppl. Mem. at 1; 
Statement of INS Counsel at Oral Arg. We are now satisfied 
that under the jurisprudence of this Court, following 
passage of AEDPA and IIRIRA, we have no jurisdiction to 
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review criminal aliens' final orders of removal, including 
such aliens' claims of statutory or constitutional error. See 
Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 237-38. Thus, lacking jurisdiction to 
entertain Catney's constitutional challenges to AEDPA and 
IIRIRA, or to adjudicate his claim that the BIA has 
incorrectly applied section 440(d) of AEDPA to his case, the 
Petition for Review will be dismissed.9  
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Catney also filed a motion for a stay of deportation pending judicial 
review of the order of deportation. Because we conclude that we have no 
jurisdiction to review the deportation order, Catney's motion for a stay 
of 
that order will be denied as moot. 
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